Saving Constitutional Rights from Judicial Scrutiny: The Savings Clause in the Law of the Commonwealth Caribbean by Burham, Margaret A.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
4-1-2004
Saving Constitutional Rights from Judicial
Scrutiny: The Savings Clause in the Law of the
Commonwealth Caribbean
Margaret A. Burham
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Foreign Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret A. Burham, Saving Constitutional Rights from Judicial Scrutiny: The Savings Clause in the Law of the Commonwealth Caribbean,





The Savings Clause in the Law of
the Commonwealth Caribbean
Margaret A. Burnham*
Since the constitutions of the Commonwealth Caribbean
states were first adopted in the 1960s, courts have been con-
founded by the savings clauses in these instruments. These
clauses place a "no go" sign over the fundamental rights grants of
the charters by grandfathering pre-existing law into the constitu-
tional regime. Meant initially as a shortcut method of marrying
common law rights and constitutional protections, the clauses
have presented particularly vexing problems of construction as
appellate tribunals have attempted to reconcile international
human rights norms with municipal law.' In July 2004, the Judi-
cial Department of the Privy Council ("Board"), the court of last
resort on death penalty cases in the large majority of the Com-
monwealth Caribbean states, decided three cases challenging the
constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty. In the cases of
Boyce,2 Matthew,' and Watson,4 the court dealt with the general
savings clause in three territories and, in deeply divided judg-
ments, rendered three different outcomes. As the Caribbean
states proceed with the establishment of a regional constitutional
court to replace the Privy Council, the savings clause will present
a challenging obstacle to the construction of a coherent
jurisprudence.
This Article analyzes the 2004 Privy Council trilogy against
the backdrop of the genesis of the savings clause in Caribbean
death penalty jurisprudence. First, I discuss the theoretical and
practical problems the savings clause creates. Second, I discuss
* Associate Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. For their
guidance, I thank Daniel Givelber, Hope Lewis, and Nicholas Blake. Kelly J.
McAnnany, Sarah E. London, and Sonya Sultan-Khan provided valuable research
assistance, and I thank them as well.
1. For a general treatment of the savings clause, see MARGARET DEMERIEUX,
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN CONSTITUTIONS 47, 55-69
(Faculty of Law Library University of West Indies ed., 1992).
2. Boyce v. The Queen, [2004] U.K.P.C. 32 (appeal taken from Barb.).
3. Matthew v. State, [2004] U.K.P.C. 33 (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
4. Watson v. The Queen, [2004] U.K.P.C. 34 (appeal taken from Jam.).
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the Privy Council's effort to reconcile the special savings clause
with human rights law on the "death row phenomenon," as devel-
oped most prominently in Soering,5 the landmark case in which
the European Court of Human Rights condemned protracted
incarceration on death row. I analyze the problem of the
mandatory sentence in death penalty jurisprudence and the Privy
Council's 2004 trilogy. Finally, I conclude that the savings clause
appears to present an insurmountable obstacle to genuine consti-
tutional process, and that therefore, its elimination should be
considered.
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SAVINGS CLAUSE PUZZLE
There are two types of savings clauses in Caribbean constitu-
tional law. The general savings clause purports to carry forth all
the laws from the old regime, while the special savings clause
insulates from challenge specific penalties or punishments that
were in existence at independence. The general clause of the Con-
stitution of Trinidad & Tobago saves all "existing law" from chal-
lenge,6 including, of course, laws that are incompatible with
fundamental rights guarantees.7 The Constitution of Jamaica
contains a special clause saving preexisting penalties from review
under the clause prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading pun-
ishment,' as well as a general clause insulating from fundamental
rights challenge those laws that were in force prior to the adoption
of the constitution.9 Only the Constitution of Belize is free from
5. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989).
6. TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. ch. I, pt. II, § 6.
7. See, e.g., Matthew v. State, [2004] U.K.P.C. 33 (appeal taken from Trin. &
Tobago).
8. Section 17 of the Constitution of Jamaica provides:
(1) No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading punishment or other treatment.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law
shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this
section to the extent that the law in question authorise the
infliction of any description of punishment which was lawful in
Jamaica immediately before the appointed day.
JAM. CONST. ch. III, § 17.
9. Section 26(8) of the Constitution of Jamaica provides:
Nothing contained in any law in force immediately before the
appointed day shall be held to be inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Chapter; and nothing done under the authority of
any such law shall be held to be done in contravention of any of
these provisions.
JAM. CONST. § 26, cl. 8. This section has been applied to save laws that on their
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any kind of savings clause.
The savings clause presents a range of interpretive chal-
lenges, some theoretical and others practical. By privileging pre-
existing laws and shielding them from scrutiny, two of the central
features of constitutionalism - constitutional supremacy and judi-
cial review - are severely undermined. The savings clause takes
back with one hand what the fundamental rights provisions are
meant to give with the other, rendering ordinary laws more sacro-
sanct than the constitution to which they should be subordinated.
Like an out of body experience, the clause requires constitutional
jurists to ignore the very constitutional protections they are
charged with enforcing. ° The clause eliminates the plasticity,
organicity, and elasticity that fundamental rights adjudication
requires to respond effectively, as it must, both to evolving univer-
sal standards" and to culturally specific normative shifts." In
sum, it violates the time honored rule, cogently expressed by Alex-
ander Hamilton, that constitutional framers must "look forward to
remote futurity.""
Because the Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions are not
uniform in their use of the savings clause, there are complex prac-
tical problems of interpretation. For example, some of the consti-
tutions have no savings clauses at all, while others have more
than one. Some constitutions provide that existing laws should be
construed to bring them into conformity with the constitution; 4
others are silent on the question of how to construe conflicting,
existing laws. The constitutional text does not always reveal
whether existing statutory law alone is continued or whether com-
mon law is also saved.15 The savings clause in the Barbados and
proper construction contravene constitutional rights. Id. See also, e.g., Baker v. The
Queen, 23 W.I.R. 463 (1975).
10. In 1994 a judge of the Jamaican Court of Appeal, upholding as saved a
sentence of whipping, wrote that the Court was not ruling on "the constitutionality or
legality of the sentence of whipping." The Queen v. Pryce, No. 89/94 [1994] S.C.C.A.
(unreported decision).
11. In Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case No. 94, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ser. C.
(June 21, 2002), the Inter-American Commission observed that the savings clause
itself violated the treaty obligations of Trinidad because it precludes domestic courts
from recognizing and enforcing international law.
12. As Lord Wilberforce famously observed in Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher,
[1980] A.C. 319, 328, constitutional interpretation should avoid the "austerity of
tabulated legalism."
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 160 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
14. See, e.g., GREN. CONST., sched. 2, pt. 1, § 1.
15. See, e.g., Jones v. Att'y Gen., (1995) 1 W.L.R. 891, 895, where the Privy Council
deemed the mandatory death penalty saved by a provision of the Constitution of the
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Guyana constitutions applies only to written law.16 The savings
clause in the Constitution of Belize was limited to five years after
independence, and hence, it has expired.
17
Consequently, in sibling constitutions, constitutional read-
ings of the same rights-granting language can vary enormously
depending on the mechanics of the particular savings clause, spe-
cifically whether the clause is general or special, and whether
there is textual guidance respecting the interpretation of the
clause. For example, in the mandatory death penalty cases, the
Privy Council has ruled that, by virtue of the savings clause, the
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment language protects
against such a penalty in Belize, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts & Nevis,
but not in Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago.
Obviously, the savings clause problem could be ameliorated
by law reform initiatives to modernize Caribbean statute law.
However, the necessary legislative resources have not been ade-
quately mobilized to affect such an overhaul, and consequently,
many of the states still labor under laws received from England
during the colonial period. The history of the death penalty illus-
trates the absurd results that can occur when independent states
are still tethered to colonial laws that have been discarded as
unjust by the colonial power itself. Although capital punishment
was abolished in England in 1965 after a long debate on the sub-
ject, the independent territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean
retained the penalty. Indeed, even before independence, there
were disparities in the death penalty laws of England and the col-
onies where more crimes were covered by the mandatory penalty.
B. JUDICIAL READINGS OF THE SAVINGS CLAUSE
Appellate courts have deployed a range of strategies to
address the savings clause. Initially, the Privy Council held that
the fundamental rights provisions overrode existing law despite
the savings clause," but it later rejected this view. 9 In a 1981
case from Trinidad holding that police misconduct constituted
Bahamas. In considering what laws were saved, the Board reasoned that "'law'
includes any instrument having the force of law and any unwritten rule of law and
'lawful' and 'lawfully' shall be construed accordingly." Id.
16. See BARB. CONST. § 26(1); Guy. CONST. § 2(1).
17. See BELIZE CONST. § 21.
18. See Chief of Police v. Powell, [1968] 12 W.I.R. 403.
19. See Baker v. The Queen, [1975] A.C. 774 (P.C. 1975) (appeal taken from Jam.)
(deeming saved a provision of the Jamaica Juveniles Act that on its true construction
was incompatible with the constitution).
252
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state action, the Privy Council appeared to revert to its first posi-
tion, refusing to apply the pre-existing common law immunity rule
despite the savings clause."
In Attorney General v. Reynolds,21 a 1979 decision, the Privy
Council resolved a clash between existing law and a fundamental
right by, in effect, rewriting the existing law to bring it into con-
formity with the constitution. The issue in Reynolds was whether
a 1959 pre-constitution emergency powers law of St. Kitts & Nevis
and Anguilla22 was insulated by the general savings clause of that
state's 1967 independence constitution.23 The parties appealed
from an award of damages to Reynolds against the state to com-
pensate him for his unlawful detention under an emergency order.
The order, which did not specify the grounds for Reynolds's deten-
tion,24 contravened the constitution's protection against unreason-
able and unnecessary emergency detention. The Privy Council
rejected the state's argument that its action was justified under
the saved emergency powers law - which did not require a reason-
ableness determination - and grafted such a requirement onto the
law in order to construe it consistently with the constitution. The
Privy Council observed:
[iut is inconceivable that a law which gave absolute power
to arrest and detain without reasonable justification would
be tolerated by a Constitution such as the present, one of
the principle purposes of which is to protect fundamental
rights and freedoms.25
1. Delay in Capital Cases
In capital cases challenging the death row phenomenon and
20. See Thornhill v. Att'y Gen., [1981] A.C. 61 (P.C. 1979) (appeal taken from Trin.
& Tobago). See also Bell v. Dir. Of Pub. Prosecutions, [1985] A.C. 937 (P.C. 1985)
(appeal taken from Jamaica)
21. Att'y Gen. v. Reynolds, [19801 A.C. 637 (P.C. 1979) (appeal taken from W.
Indies).
22. The Leeward Islands Emergency Powers Order in Council of 1959 provided:
The Administrator of a colony . . . may during a period of
emergency.., make such laws for the colony as appear to him to be
necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defense of
the Colony or the maintenance of public order . .. ."
SIR FRED PHILLIPS, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 53 (2002).
23. See id. at 55. See also ST. KITTS & NEVIS & ANGUILLA CONST. § 103(5).
24. The detention order provided "[t]hat you John Reynolds during the year 1967,
both within and outside of the state, encouraged civil disobedience throughout the
state, thereby endangering the peace, public safety and public order of the state."
Reynolds, [1980] A.C. at 661.
25. Id. at 655.
253
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:2 & 3
the mandatory penalty, the Privy Council's opinions construing
the savings clause have been inconsistent, leading critics to claim
that these cases are result-driven. In the 1983 case of Riley v.
Attorney General,26 the Privy Council held that the special savings
clause in the Constitution of Jamaica insulated from scrutiny pro-
longed delay in carrying out the penalty. Following precedent,27
the Board concluded that even if inhuman and degrading, delay
could never contravene the constitution because of the operation
of the special savings clause. The Board observed that where
undue delay did not afford a claim for relief from the sentence
prior to the constitution, it could not be a ground for relief as a
fundamental constitutional right. The Board wrote that "[a]n
obvious instance of a description of punishment exceeding in
extent that authorized by law would be the execution of a death
sentence by burning at the stake."28
In Riley, the Privy Council set forth three factors that, taken
together, engage the punishment savings clause bar. The Board
held that fundamental rights cannot override existing criminal
sanctions where the challenged governmental conduct: (1) is
"done under the authority of law;" (2) involves "infliction of pun-
ishment of a description authorized by the law in question" that
was lawful in Jamaica prior to the effective date of the constitu-
tion; and (3) does not exceed "the description of the punishment so
authorised."29 A divided Board held that the first two conditions
were clearly met, and that, as to the third, delay was not an
unconstitutional denial of the protection against inhuman or
degrading punishment because "the legality of a delayed execu-
tion by hanging of a sentence of death lawfully imposed... could
"130never have been questioned before independence ....
26. Riley v. Att'y Gen., [1983] 1 A.C. 719 (P.C. 1979) (appeal taken from Jam.)
27. In de Freitas v. Benny, [1976] A.C. 239 (P.C. 1975) (appeal taken from Trin. &
Tobago), the Privy Council held that the savings clause in Trinidad's constitution
saved a death sentence from challenge on grounds of prolonged delay. In Abbott v.
Att'y Gen., [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1342, 1348 (P.C. 1979) (appeal taken from Trin. &
Tobago), the Committee wrote that a case of unconstitutional delay in execution of a
capital sentence "is without precedent and, in their Lordships' view, would involve
delay measured in years, rather than in months ... "
28. Riley, [1983] 1 A.C. at 726.
29. Id.
30. Id. As Margaret DeMerieux has noted, in Riley the Privy Council's awkward
formulation of the effect of the savings bar is revealing. The Board observed that
since "[tihe legality of delayed execution by hanging, of a sentence of death could
never have been questioned before independence" it was therefore not subject to
constitutional challenge. Id. at 561 (emphasis added). Demerieux points out that the
"could never have been questioned" language actually masks the disturbing fact that
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Ten years later, in Pratt,31 the Privy Council revisited the
issue and famously reversed Riley. The Privy Council adopted the
minority view in Riley, holding that the premise of the majority
there, that delay in the execution of capital punishment would not
have been unlawful before independence, was simply wrong.2
The Pratt Board distinguished types of punishment, such as death
by hanging, which it held were saved, from the method of imple-
menting permissible punishments, which was subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny. The special clause saved the penalty, but not the
means of its application, and the general savings clause could not
insulate from challenge prolonged delays in the execution of the
sentence because such practices offended the common law and
were not tolerated in the colonial era.
3 4
2. The Mandatory Death Penalty
The Privy Council would ultimately come to apply the escape
hatch ingeniously fashioned in Pratt to the mandatory penalty as
well. The special clause could not save the mandatory penalty
from scrutiny, but the rub came in interpreting the general clause
in the 2004 cases of Boyce, Matthew, and Watson.
In an early reading of the effect of the savings clause on pun-
ishments claimed to be unconstitutionally inhuman or degrading,
the Privy Council held in a 1967 Rhodesian case 5 that a
mandatory death penalty for arson was insulated from review.3
lengthy delays were perfectly lawful and systemic in the pre-constitution period.
DEMERIEUX, supra note 1, at 63.
31. Pratt v. Att'y Gen., [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jam.).
32. Before Pratt was decided, the minority view in Riley had garnered support in
some of the Caribbean appellate courts. See, e.g., Re Gayman Jurisingh and Others,
[1993] 48 W.I.R. 301.
33. The Pratt Board wrote:
Their Lordships will therefore depart from Riley . .. and hold that
section 17(2) is confined to authorizing descriptions of punishment
for which the court may pass sentence and does not prevent the
appellant from arguing that the circumstances in which the
executive intend to carry out a sentence are in breach of section
17(1).
Pratt, [1994] 2 A.C. at 29.
34. Guyana, which had severed its ties with the Privy Council, rejected Pratt's
rule that delays exceeding five years were presumptively unconstitutional. See
Yaseen v. Att'y Gen., No. 19-20 [1996] (Guy. C.A.) (unpublished decision) (on file with
author).
35. Runyowa v. The Queen, [1967] 1 A.C. 26 (P.C. 1966) (appeal taken from
Rhodesia and Nyasaland).
36. Section 60(1) of the then Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland proscribed
torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment. See RHODESIA
255
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Then in Ong,7 an appeal from Singapore decided in 1981, the
Board, per Lord Diplock, upheld a mandatory death penalty for
drug trafficking. While the Privy Council decided these two Car-
ibbean cases on other grounds, the capital sentences under review
in Abbott v. Attorney General" and de Freitas v. Benny39 also
involved mandatory penalties. In de Freitas, the Privy Council
declared that the "[s]entence of death for murder.., is mandatory
under the Offences Against the Person Ordinance, which was in
force at the commencement of the Constitution."4" In Abbott, the
petitioner challenged excessive delay in carrying out the
mandatory sentence; the Privy Council rejected the due process
claim on the ground that the delay was not excessive as measured
against existing practice in Trinidad at the time its constitution
came into force.41
The Privy Council began to pave the way for a more searching
approach to mandatory sentences in Lewis v. Attorney General."
Although that 2000 case upholding a death row inmate's right to
representations before the Mercy Committee did not address
directly the constitutionality of the mandatory sentence, it made
clear that adequate process required individualized sentencing,
thereby setting the stage for greater judicial oversight of the right
to mitigation.
AND NYASALAND CONST. § 60(1). Section 60(3) of the constitution saved punishments
authorized before the effective date of the constitution. Id. at § 60(3).
37. Ong Ah Chuan v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1981] A.C. 648 (P.C. 1980) (appeal taken
from Sing.).
38. Abbott v. Att'y Gen., [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1342, 1348 (P.C. 1978) (appeal taken
from Sing.).
39. de Freitas v. Benny, [1976] A.C. 239 (P.C. 1975) (appeal taken from Trin. &
Tobago).
40. Id. at 245.
41. While in Abbott the Privy Council equated existing practice with existing law
for purposes of the savings clause, see Abbott, [1979] 1 W.L.R. at 1348, in Bell, the
Board took a different view of the effect of existing practice on fundamental rights.
See Bell v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1985] A.C. 937, 938 (appeal taken from
Jamaica). Bell challenged pretrial delay as violative of his constitutionally protected
right to "a fair hearing within a reasonable time." JAM. CONST. § 20(1). Although no
speedy trial right existed before the constitution, and the existing practice tolerated
long delays, the Privy Council held that the constitution conferred a new enforceable
right to a speedy trial. See Bell, [1985] A.C. at 938.
42. Lewis v. Att'y Gen., [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C. 2000) (appeal taken from Jam.). In
Lewis, the Privy Council observed that the constitution protected executive review by
the Mercy Committee where the "death penalty is automatic in capital cases... [and]
the sentencing judge has no discretion." Id. at 78.
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a. The Reyes trilogy
In a trilogy of cases decided in 2002,4" the Privy Council
struck down the mandatory death penalty for the first time,
unambiguously declaring it to be a violation of the prohibition
against inhuman or degrading punishment, and one not saved
under a special savings clause regime. The three cases struck
down statutory schemes prescribing death for all crimes of mur-
der," as well as a statute preserving the penalty for specific clas-
ses of aggravated murder.45
In the lead case of the trilogy, Reyes v. The Queen,46 the Board
held that a Belize criminal statute providing that, "[elvery person
who commits murder [by shooting, among other specified means]
shall suffer death"4 7 violated that state's constitutional prohibition
on "torture or . . . inhuman or degrading punishment or other
treatment."48 Reyes overruled the holding of the Belize Court of
Appeal in Lauriano v. Attorney General49 that the constitutional
right of executive review for murder convictions was constitution-
ally sufficient for mitigation. No general savings clause was
involved in Reyes, for the savings clause of the Constitution of
Belize had expired.
In Regina v. Hughes, the Board rejected St. Lucia's argument
that its special savings clause 50 rendered its mandatory death pen-
alty beyond the reach of the inhuman or degrading punishment
43. See Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (P.C. 2002) (appeal taken from
Belize); The Queen v. Hughes, [2002] 2 A.C. 259 (P.C. 2002) (appeal taken from St.
Lucia); Fox v. The Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 284 (P.C. 2002) (appeal taken from St. Kitts &
Nevis). Fox and Hughes affirmed the ruling of the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal
in Spence v. The Queen that the automatic imposition of the death penalty
constituted inhuman and degrading punishment or treatment. See Spence v. The
Queen [2001] 60 W.L.R. 1077. These cases are discussed in detail in Nicholas Blake
and Saul Lehrfreund, The Constitution Amendment Act 2002 and the Death Penalty,
19 CARm. L.B. 2, 7 (2002).
44. See Fox, [2002] 2 A.C. at 290; Hughes, [2002] 2 A.C. at 264.
45. See Reyes, [2002] 2 A.C. 235.
46. Id. at 235.
47. Id. at 238. Section 102 of the Criminal Code of Belize originally provided that
"[elvery person who commits murder shall suffer death." Id. In 1994, Section 102
was amended by Section 114 of the Code, which, among other changes to Section 102,
sets forth specific categories of murder to which the mandatory sentence applies,
including shooting.
48. BELIZE CONST. pt. II, § 7.
49. Lauriano v. Att'y Gen., [1995] 3 Belize L.R. 77 (Belize C.A.).
50. The St. Lucia Constitution Order, adopted in 1967, provides in sched. 2, T 10:
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall
be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of Section 5 of
the Constitution to the extent that the law in question authorizes
257
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clause. In Fox v. The Queen,51 the companion case to Hughes, the
court ruled that the mandatory death penalty52 ran afoul of the
inhuman or degrading punishment clause in the Constitution of
St. Kitts & Nevis and was not immunized by the special savings
clause. 3
The Belize case, Reyes, was a relatively easy one for the Board
because there was no special savings clause. Relying heavily on
international human rights norms that stress the importance of
the judicial role in determining penalties in capital cases, and on
developments in comparative criminal law that place increased
importance on proportional sentencing,54 the case reveals how
thoroughly globalized death penalty jurisprudence has become,
especially since Soering condemned the death row phenomenon,
55
and Makwanyane exemplified purposive and transjudicial
constitutionalism. 6
The adjudicatory model adopted by the Reyes Board situates
the domestic constitutional question within a wider and highly
integrated comparative and international normative framework.
While abolition is not yet a norm of international human rights, it
is a generally accepted principle that certain safeguards must be
met before the penalty may be imposed,57 and that vulnerable
the infliction of any description of punishment that was lawful in
St. Lucia immediately before [the constitution's effective date].
ST. LUCIA CONST. ORDER, sched. 2, 10.
51. Fox v. The Queen [2002] 2 A.C. 284.
52. Section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act, applied to the then colony of
St. Kitts & Nevis in 1873, provides: "Whosoever is convicted of murder shall suffer
death as a felon." Id. at 290; Offences Against the Person Act, sec. 2 (1861) (Eng.).
53. The savings clause of the Constitution of St. Kitts & Nevis, ST. KITTS & NEVIS
CONST. sched. 2, 9, is essentially the same as that of St. Lucia. See ST. LucIA CONST.
ORDER, sched. 2, 10.
54. See Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. at 253 (P.C. 2002) (appeal taken from
Belize). The Reyes court cited, inter alia, the Canadian non-capital case of The Queen
v. Smith, [19871 1 S.C.R. 1045, and State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) S.A.L.R. 391, 433
para. 94.
55. See Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439
(1989).
56. See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) S.A.L.R. at 433. See also State v. Williams, 1995
S.A.C.L.R. LEXIS 249, where the South African Constitutional Court adopted a
purposive approach in considering the legality of juvenile whipping. The term
"transjudicial constitutionalism" was first introduced by Ann-Marie Slaughter. See
Ann-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 99 (1994); Ann-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103
(2000).
57. While international law does not prohibit capital punishment, its application
is limited by many human rights treaties. See International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 6 (requiring a fair trial and conviction
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individuals, such as juveniles and pregnant women,58 may not be
sentenced to death.
One might expect that the global approach in Reyes would
have limited utility in the companion savings clause cases,
Fox and Hughes. In Reyes the Board observed that the protec-
tions of the European Convention59 were applicable to Belize as
a dependent territory from 1953 until that country's inde-
pendence in 1981.60 Human rights tribunals have interpreted
Article Three of the Convention,6 and the regional treaties
that mirror its provisions, 2 to bar mandatory capital sentenc-
for aggravated crimes before the death penalty may be imposed) [hereinafter
"ICCPR]; American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, art. 4, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (forbidding capital punishment in states that have already abolished it);
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("European Convention"), done at Rome Nov. 4, 1950, Protocol 13, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
(Protocol 13 entered into force Jan. 7, 2003) (prohibiting capital punishment for all
times) [hereinafter "ECHR"]; ICCPR, 2nd Optional Protocol (1990); Safeguards
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty, E.S.C. Res.
1984/50, U.N. ESCOR (1984) (exempting from capital punishment those under 18
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, pregnant women, new
mothers, and those who are or have become insane).
58. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 6 (forbidding states from imposing the death
penalty for juvenile offenders or on pregnant women).
59. ECHR, supra note 57, art. 3 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
60. Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. at 247 para. 27. ECHR, supra note 57, art.
63(1) allows "any state [to] ... declare ... that the present Convention shall extend to
all or any of the territories for whose international relations it is responsible." The
United Kingdom applied the Convention to its colonies from 1953 until their
independence.
61. The Reyes court cited The Queen v. Offen, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 253, for the
proposition that the mandatory death penalty for aggravated murder might
contravene Article 3 of the European Convention. See also Soering v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989), where the European Court
of Human Rights stressed the importance of mitigating factors in connection with its
Article 3 ruling. The 6th Protocol to the ECHR, adopted in 1983, abolished the death
penalty during peacetime. See ECHR, supra note 57.
62. The fundamental rights approach of the European Convention, more detailed
than the Universal Declaration, provided the model for the Nigerian Independence
Constitution, upon which in turn the Caribbean independence constitutions were
based. See DEMERIEUX, supra note 1, at 23. The Nigerian Constitution contained a
bill of rights that was almost identical to the European Convention. See Christof
Heyns, African Human Rights Law and the European Convention, 11 S. AFR. J. HUM.
RTs. 252, 257 (1995). Article 2 of the Convention protects the right to life "save in the
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this
penalty is provided by law." See ECHR, supra note 57, art. 2. The Caribbean
independence constitutions include similar or identical language. However,
historically the death penalty has been deemed an exception to the fundamental right
to life. The Privy Council has consistently held that death by hanging violates neither
the right to life nor the protection against inhuman or degrading treatment. See, e.g.,
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ing.1 Hence, the Board seemed to be saying that' the inhuman or
degrading punishment clause in the Constitution of Belize should
be read consistently with the interpretation given to the clause on
which it was based in the European Convention. 5 Applying the
Bangalore Principles,6" the Board observed that adherence to
international norms should govern in the absence of specific con-
trary textual constraints."
Where almost all of the Caribbean Commonwealth constitu-
tions contain similar, if not identical, bills of rights originating in
the European Convention, one could reasonably expect uniform
interpretation of the rights language, but here again the savings
clause handicapped the pursuit of a common constitutional juris-
prudence, for the international and comparative law focus at the
heart of Reyes is totally out of play in Fox and Hughes.
As I have discussed, the Reyes Board canvassed a broad array
of precedent outside of, but binding on, the Caribbean jurisdiction
by virtue of the presumed intent of the framers, European and
Caribbean alike. Like Belize, St. Lucia and St. Kitts & Nevis
inherited their fundamental rights provisions from the European
Convention, and by virtue of the "Colonial Clause,"68 these states
Reyes, [2002] 2 A.C. at 247 para. 29. Contra Makwayane, [1995] (3) S.A.L.R. at 415
(striking the penalty as violative of the constitutional rights to life and to dignity).
63. The Reyes Board cited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
report that included the case of Downer v. Jamaica, Report No. 41/00 Inter-Am.
C.H.R. (Apr. 13, 2000), applying the bar against inhuman and degrading punishment
in the American Convention on Human Rights to prohibit mandatory death
sentences, as well as Edwards v. The Bahamas, Report No. 48/01 Inter-Am. C.H.R.
(Apr. 4, 2001), and Baptiste v. Grenada, Report No. 38/00 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Apr. 13,
2000). See Reyes, [2002] 2 A.C. at 236.
64. This is implicit rather than explicit in the Board's judgment. The Board wrote
that where the European Convention applied to the pre-independence period, the
Constitution of Belize could not properly be read to provide diminished rights to its
newly independent citizens. Reyes, [2002] 2 A.C. at 247 para. 28.
65. Id. at 245 para. 23.
66. The Bangalore Principles were adopted by a group of Commonwealth jurists at
a 1988 meeting in Bangalore. See "Report of Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic
Application of International Human Rights Norms, Bangalore, India", reproduced in
Michael Kirby, The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights By Reference to
International Human Rights Norms, 62 Austl. L.J. 514, 531-32 (1988). The principles
encourage reference to and reliance on international human rights norms where
domestic constitutional or statutory law is uncertain or incomplete. See Lord Lester
of Herne Hill, The Challenge of Bangalore: Making Human Rights a Practical Reality
Commonwealth L. Bull. 47 (1999).
67. The Board wrote that, "the courts will not be astute to find that a Constitution
fails to conform with international standards of humanity and individual right, unless
it is clear, on a proper interpretation of the Constitution, that it does." Id. at 235
para. 28.
68. ECHR, supra note 57, art. 63(1). For an account of the history of the Colonial
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were also subject to its protections until they achieved their inde-
pendence. However, the argument from original intent is strik-
ingly absent in those cases. On the contrary, those cases rest not
on transjudicial human rights analysis, but rather on a careful
parsing of the constitutional and statutory texts at play.
b. Pinder v. The Queen
The promise held out by the 2002 mandatory penalty trilogy,
of a thickened, internationalist perspective on human rights law
in the Commonwealth Caribbean, has been all but extinguished.
An early indication that a majority of the Lords considered them-
selves trapped by the savings clause came in the non-capital 2002
case of Pinder v. The Queen,69 which was decided on the heels of
Reyes, Fox, and Hughes. Both Fox and Hughes, as well as Pinder,
involved the special savings clause.
The defendant in Pinder, convicted of several armed robber-
ies, challenged the constitutionality of corporal punishment in the
Bahamas. That state's constitution forbids inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment or punishment," and it saves all punishments that
were lawful before the adoption of the constitution. 1 Flogging
was the prescribed penalty for several serious offenses, including
robbery, when the constitution was adopted in 1973.2 In 1984,
the Bahamas abolished corporal punishment, but in 1991,
responding to public outrage over escalating crime rates, the legis-
lature restored whipping and flogging and increased other penal-
ties.73 The Privy Council rejected defendant's argument that,
having abolished flogging on the grounds that it is inhuman and
degrading,74 the state could not reinstate it without amending the
constitution.75 The Board reasoned that although flogging is an
inhuman and degrading penalty, it was immunized by the special
Clause, see A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN
AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 288 (2001).
69. Pinder v. The Queen, [2002] 1 A.C. 620 (P.C. 2002) (appeal taken from Bah.).
70. BAH. CONST. ch. III, art. 17(1).
71. Article 17(2) of the Constitution of the Bahamas provides that the protection
against inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment does not extend to laws that
"authorize[ I the infliction of any description of punishment . . . lawful" before the
adoption of the constitution. Id. art. 17(2).
72. See Pinder, [2002] 1 A.C. at 620 para. 42.
73. See id. para. 4.
74. The Prime Minister of the Bahamas described corporal punishment as
"retrogressive and an act of torture" when he recommended its abolition to the
legislature in 1984. See id. para. 42. Indeed, the prosecutor in Pinder conceded that
the penalty was inhuman and degrading. See id. para. 45.
75. See id. para. 26.
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punishment savings clause, despite the intervening action of the
legislature in abolishing it.76 In short, the penalty would have
been constitutionally forbidden but for the savings clause. The
Board observed that because it diminished the scope of guaran-
teed rights, the punishment savings clause had to be narrowly
construed. But the Board went on to state that there was no way
to avoid the insulating effect of the clause, for to do so would turn
"narrow construction [into] misconstruction."77 The majority of
the Board ignored the protection afforded the defendant by inter-
national law.7"
Taken to its logical extreme, Pinder stands for the proposition
that as long as the special punishment savings clause exists,
future legislatures can always return to the barbarism of a pen-
alty sanctioned at the time of the adoption of the constitution, no
matter how often or on what grounds the punishment may have
been repealed. 79 Neither death by hanging, nor flogging, nor the
use of manacles and leg irons will ever be beyond the constitu-
tional pale, even if these practices are universally abhorred and
condemned. Moreover, subject only to the rule of proportionality,
the legislature can impose a preexisting punishment, such as flog-
ging for a crime of any nature, as it is the punishment itself that is
saved. In sum, by virtue of the savings clause, the Commonwealth
Caribbean is free to compete with the world's most repressive
criminal justice systems, despite the generous guarantees of its
constitutions.
c. The Boyce Trilogy
On September 5, 2002, in the wake of the decision in the
Reyes trilogy, the Barbados legislature amended the constitution
in order to shield the mandatory death penalty from constitutional
review. 0 The intent of the amendment was to reverse Privy Coun-
76. See id. paras. 6-27.
77. See id. para. 14.
78. As a member state of the Organization of American States, the Bahamas is
bound by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. xxvi, which
protects against cruel, infamous or unusual punishment. INTER-AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
36 (1978).
79. Pinder, [2002] 1 A.C. at 620 para. 27.
80. Section 15 of the Constitution of Barbados was amended as follows:
(1) No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading punishment or treatment.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law
shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this
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cil decisions on the death row phenomenon and on the right to a
determination by the human rights tribunals before a state could
carry out the death penalty.
Previously Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago had taken steps
to reverse the effect of Pratt and its progeny. These states repudi-
ated some of their international treaty obligations." These defi-
ant acts of Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago in protest
of the Privy Council rulings formed the backdrop against which
the Board would consider the applicability of the general savings
clause to mandatory sentencing in 2004.
The Board decided three cases in July 2004 that addressed
the general savings clause. Taken together, the three decisions,
Boyce v. The Queen,82 Matthew v. State," and Watson v. The
Queen,84 address the question left open in the 2002 trilogy, Reyes, 5
Hughes,"8 and Fox87 of whether the general savings clause shields
the mandatory death penalty. The 2002 trilogy, like Pinder,
section to the extent that the law in question authorizes the
infliction of any punishment or the administration of any
treatment that was lawful in Barbados immediately before 30th
November 1966.
(3) The following shall not be held to be inconsistent with or in
contravention of this section:
(a) the imposition of a mandatory sentence of death or the
execution of such a sentence;
(b) any delay in executing a sentence of death imposed on a
person in respect of a criminal offence under the law of
Barbados of which he has been convicted;
(c) the holding of any person who is in prison, or otherwise
lawfully detained, pending execution of a sentence of death
imposed on that person, in conditions, or under arrangements,
which immediately before the coming into operation of the
Constitution Amendment Act, 2002
i. were prescribed by or under the Prisons Act, as then in
force; or
ii. were otherwise practiced in Barbados in relation to
persons so in prison or so detained.
BARB. CONST. ch. III, § 15, amended by Constitution (Amend.) Act, 2002-14, Supp. to
Official Gazette No. 74 (Sept. 5, 2002).
81. See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002).
82. Boyce v. The Queen, [2004] U.K.P.C. 32 (appeal taken from Barb.).
83. Matthew v. State, [2004] U.K.P.C. 33 (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
84. Watson v. The Queen, [2004] U.K.P.C. 34 (appeal taken from Jam.).
85. Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (P.C. 2002) (appeal taken from Belize).
86. The Queen v. Hughes, [2002] 2 A.C. 259 (P.C. 2002) (appeal taken from St.
Lucia).
87. Fox v. The Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 284 (P.C. 2002) (appeal taken from St. Kitts &
Nevis).
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involved only the special savings clause. Matthew v. State
reversed the decision in the 2004 case of Roodal v. State,8 which
struck the mandatory penalty in Trinidad & Tobago, despite the
general savings clause.
In these three 2004 cases, a deeply divided nine member
Board breathed new life into a savings clause thought to be at risk
after the Reyes trilogy sidelined the special clause and Roodal took
on the general clause. The debates laid bare by the several opin-
ions in these three cases -Boyce an appeal from Barbados, Watson
an appeal from Jamaica, and Matthew an appeal from Trinidad &
Tobago - underscore the sharp and volatile divisions within the
Privy Council and the legal community that it leads. The Council
ruled that although it infringes upon a fundamental right estab-
lished by the constitutions of all three states, the mandatory
death penalty is nevertheless constitutional in Barbados and Trin-
idad & Tobago, but not in Jamaica. The cases illustrate the enor-
mous obstacle that the savings clause poses for the development of
a predictable, coherent, and uniform Caribbean constitutional
jurisprudence.
In Boyce, by a five-four majority, the Board, per Lord Hoff-
mann, held that although the mandatory death penalty 9 is an
"inhuman or degrading punishment" within the meaning of the
Constitution of Barbados," the law pre-dated the constitution,
and was thereby saved under the general savings clause.9' The
Board reasoned that while the mandatory death penalty is uni-
formly condemned in international human rights law92 and in con-
stitutional law,93 as explicated by the Board in Reyes, the
Constitution of Barbados leaves it to Parliament, and not to the
88. Roodal v. State, [2003] U.K.P.C. 78 (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
89. Section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act (1994) provides "Any person
convicted of murder may be sentenced to, and suffer, death." The Act was successor
legislation to the Offences Against the Person Act (1861), which provided that
"whosoever shall be convicted of murder shall suffer death as a felon." Boyce v. The
Queen, [2004] U.K.P.C. 32 paras. 8-9 (appeal taken from Barb.).
90. BARB. CONST. ch. III, § 15(1).
91. See id. § 26; Boyce, [20041 U.K.P.C. 32 para. 30.
92. Here the Board cited to Edwards v. The Bahamas, Report No. 48/01 Inter-Am.
C.H.R. (Apr. 4, 2001) (holding the mandatory penalty inconsistent with the American
Declaration of Human Rights); Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case No. 94 Inter-
Am. C.H.R., ser. C (June 21, 2002) (holding it inconsistent with the American
Convention on Human Rights); and Kennedy v. Trin. and Tobago, Comm. No. (CCPR/
C/67/D/845/1999) [1999] U.N.H.R.C. 55 (Dec. 31, 1999) (holding it inconsistent with
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). See Boyce, [2004] U.K.P.C.
32 para. 22.
93. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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courts, to get rid of laws that contravene current norms. The
Board rejected the arguments of the appellants that: (1) the court
had the power to modify the mandatory penalty law to bring it
into conformity with the bill of rights,94 and that (2) such modifica-
tion was necessary to avoid placing Barbados in breach of its
international treaty obligations.95
The Privy Council pursued these questions in an appeal from
the Court of Appeal of Trinidad & Tobago in the companion case of
Matthew v. State. Matthew raised a tricky question of statutory
and constitutional interpretation which the Committee, sitting in
a panel of five, first addressed in Roodal v. State.
Roodal challenged the imposition upon him of a mandatory
death sentence pursuant to a 1925 statute" which provides that,
le]very person convicted of murder shall suffer death."97 Two con-
stitutions were at play in Roodal. The first Constitution of Trini-
dad & Tobago, the Independence Charter adopted in 1962,
contained a clause rendering the bill of rights protections for the
right to life98 and to be free from cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment" inapplicable to laws then in force.' 0 In 1976, Trini-
dad & Tobago adopted its current constitution, the primary pur-
pose of which was to establish the state as an independent
republic. The 1976 constitution altered the savings clause; the
1976 version provides that "[n]othing in [the relevant bills of
94. This argument rested on a reading of Section 4(1) of the Barbados
Independence Order, which provides that existing laws are to be "construed with such
modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring
them into conformity with the Barbados Independence Act 1966 and this Order."
BARB. CONST. indp. ord. § 4(1). The modification urged by the appellant was
substituting "may be sentenced to... death" for "shall be sentenced to... death." See
Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (P.C. 2002) (appeal taken from Belize).
95. Barbados is bound by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man. It has ratified the American Convention on Human Rights and the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. See Boyce, [2004] U.K.P.C. 32
para. 16.
In the view of the four dissenters in Boyce, Section 4(1) the Barbados
Independence Order, which provided for modification of existing laws, offered
adequate grounds for eliminating altogether the mandatory punishment, particularly
when considered in light of the state's international obligations. Id. paras. 77-82
(Cornhill, Nicholls, Steyn & Walker, L., dissenting).
96. Roodal v. State [2003] U.K.P.C. 78 para. 2.
97. Id.; Offences Against the Person Act § 4 (1925) (Trin. & Tobago).
98. TRm. & TOBAGO CONST. (1962) § 1(a).
99. See id. § 2(b).
100. Section 3(1) of the 1962 Constitution of Trinidad & Tobago provides: "Sections
1 and 2 of this Constitution shall not apply in relation to any law that is in force in
Trinidad & Tobago at the commencement of this Constitution." Id. § 3(1).
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rights provisions] shall invalidate.., an existing law." 1' "Invali-
dating" a law was different, the Roodal Board concluded, from the
"shut-out" language used in the 1962 savings clause.1"2 Based pri-
marily on this altered clause, the Board in Roodal held that the
mandatory death penalty law - Section 4 - could be "modified,"
10 3
and thereby brought into conformity with the constitution without
altogether invalidating the statute.
A nine member Board, four of whom sat in Roodal, rejected
the reasoning of that case in Matthew. Matthew, also a split deci-
sion, held that the difference between the savings clauses of the
1962 and the 1976 constitutions was immaterial. A passionate
dissenting judgment by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead declared the
majority view to be a cramped and unwarranted reading of the
constitutional protections and an affront to international law.
Addressing bluntly the motivation of the governments relying on
the savings clause to obstruct human rights protection, his Lord-
ship wrote:
Despite these constitutional and international guarantees
the governments of these countries insist on continuing to
inflict on their citizens a form of punishment which, by
today's standards, is inhuman. Each government justifies
its mandatory sentences of death for murder by pointing to
a transitional savings clause in the country's constitution
in respect of laws in force when the constitution was
adopted. Each government seeks thereby to clothe a form
of inhuman punishment with continuing constitutional
legitimacy and an appearance of human rights
respectability.104
In the third case of the group, Watson, on appeal from the
Court of Appeal of Jamaica, the Board considered whether a 1992
act which applies the mandatory penalty to capital but not non-
101. Roodal, [20031 U.K.P.C. 78 para. 22.
102. See id.
103. The 1976 Constitution Act requires such modifications. Section 5(1) of the
1976 Constitution Act provides:
Subject to the provisions of this section, the operation of the
existing law on and after the appointed day shall not be affected by
the revocation of the Order in Council of 1962 but the existing laws
shall be construed with such modifications, adaptations,
qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring them
into conformity with this Act.
TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. (1976) § 5(1).
104. Matthew v. State, [2004] U.K.P.C. 33 para. 68 (appeal taken from Trin. &
Tobago) (Nichols, L., dissenting).
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capital murder l°5 contravened the constitutional prohibition
against torture or inhuman or degrading punishment. 10 6 The 1992
act was adopted in an effort to ameliorate the harsh effects of the
predecessor 1864 Offenses Against the Person Act that, just like
the laws of Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago, applied the
mandatory penalty to all murders. As with the constitutions of
Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago, the Constitution of Jamaica
includes a general savings clause. 10 7 Reading the savings clause
narrowly, so as to grant maximum protection under the Bill of
Rights, the Board held that the 1992 law was not protected by the
savings clause, despite its direct descent from the Offences
Against the Person Act of 1864. As the savings clause was with-
out effect, the Board applied the teaching of Reyes v. The Queen
that the mandatory penalty is inhuman or degrading, and then
struck down the 1992 statute.108 As the concurring minority of
four observed, this outcome represents a "gross anomaly:"
One strange, and to our mind regrettable, implication of
the majority decision in Matthew, Boyce and Joseph and
the present appeal is that Jamaica would have succeeded in
maintaining an objectionable nineteenth century law if it
had not attempted to mitigate its harshness.'0 9
What is even more curious about the result in these three
cases is that Jamaica's revised mandatory penalty statute would
likely have passed muster in either Trinidad & Tobago or Barba-
dos. The constitutions of those two states include within the defi-
nition of existing laws those which have been "altered," so long as
the altered law does not derogate from the fundamental right in
question any more than the pre-independence law." 0 In Jamaica,
105. See Watson v. The Queen, (2004] U.K.P.C. 34 para. 2 (appeal taken from
Jam.).
106. Section 17(1) of the Constitution of Jamaica provides that "[n]o person shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment."
JAM. CONST. § 17(1).
107. Section 26 of the Constitution of Jamaica saves from scrutiny under the
fundamental rights provisions those laws that were in force before the appointed day
when the constitution came into effect. Id. § 26(8-9).
108. After Watson, Jamaica now has the most well-defined capital classification
regime in the region. The death penalty is now in the discretion of the trial judge for
capital offenses.
109. Watson, [2004] U.K.P.C. 34 para. 63.
110. Section 6(1)(c) of the Constitution of Trinidad & Tobago includes in the
definition of saved existing law: "[an enactment that alters an existing law but does
not derogate from any fundamental right guaranteed by this Chapter in a manner in
which or to an extent to which the existing law did not previously derogate from that
right." TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. § 6(1)(c). See also BARB. CONST. § 26(1)(c).
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on the other hand, permissible changes are more limited. The
Constitution of Jamaica saves only existing laws that are unmodi-
fied or those that have been "reproduced in identical form.""'
d. Griffith v. The Queen
That the Privy Council has begun to back away from the high-
water mark of Pratt in its engagement with the Caribbean death
penalty is further suggested by Griffith,"2 a December 2004 deci-
sion applying the Boyce holding. In Griffith, the facts supported a
finding that the appellants were part of a group of young men
involved in a fatal stabbing that resulted from a robbery gone
awry. The state relied on a constructive malice theory to support
the murder convictions of the men who did not actually stab the
victim, and a mandatory death sentence was imposed by the Bar-
bados trial court."3 Even though there was no determination,
either at the guilt phase or at the penalty phase, of the individual
mens rea of the defendants, the Privy Council sustained the con-
victions against a due process challenge, because, it concluded, fel-
ony murder was not unconstitutional and the mandatory
sentencing regime was saved under Boyce.
C. CONCLUSION
Manifestly, legislative and judicial attention could address
the mischief that the savings clause continues to create in Carib-
bean constitutional law. Commentators have urged constitutional
amendment to eliminate the clause.14 The Caribbean Court of
Justice will be pressed to bring some order to this area of constitu-
tional law, for it will be charged with harmonizing the municipal
law of the member states and identifying the collective social
ethos of the Caribbean people.
111. Section 26(9)(1) of the Constitution of Jamaica protects laws "reproduced in
identical form in any consolidation or revision of law with only such adaptations or
modifications as are necessary or expedient by reason of its inclusion in such
consolidation or revision." JAM. CONST. § 26(9)(1)
112. Griffith and Ors. v. The Queen, [2004] U.K.P.C. 58 (appeal from Barbados).
113. The death sentences in Griffith were reduced to life terms while their appeal
was pending, but before the judgment was entered in the Privy Council.
114. See SIMEON C. R. MCINTOSH, CARIBBEAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM:
RETHINKING THE WEST INDIAN POLITY 260 (2002). Lloyd Barnett suggests the savings
clause was not well considered at the time of its adoption, and that the saved statutes
and laws should have been more closely examined to determine whether they were
consistent with fundamental rights guarantees before excluding them from
constitutional reach. LLOYD BARNETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF JAMAICA 380 n.44
(1977).
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Principled and reasoned decision-making is, of course, the
sine qua non of common law constitutional adjudication. But,
these mandatory sentencing cases, which raise identical human
rights issues, rest on different rationales because of the operation
of the general and special savings clauses. Constitutionalism can-
not survive so long as the multiple iterations of the savings clause
preempt, in radically different ways, basic rights. What is left is a
constitution without constitutionalism, an instrument with no
true normative message or predictive value. 115 The new Carib-
bean Court of Justice will necessarily confront the savings clauses
as it seeks to harmonize the region's constitutional law and to
engender regard for international norms.
115. For a discussion of the phenomenon of empty constitutionalism, see H.W.O.
Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African
Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD: THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM PAPERS 65 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993). In the African
context, empty constitutionalism has more to do with the failure of constitutional
instruments to hold governments to the rule of law than with the inelasticity of the
constitutional terms themselves.
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